Taft Katsura Agreement

Dennett argued that the memorandum would amount to a binding agreement between Japan and the United States, in which Japan would leave the Philippines alone if the United States let Japan oversee Korea. Since then, historians have debated this claim. Some argue that Taft-Katsura was not a deal at all, let alone a deal with a pro quo quid. According to this view, the memorandum was only an exchange of views that the two sides had previously shared. Others argue that it was a quid pro quo, precisely because Taft “expressed U.S. agreement to Japanese control of Korea in exchange for Japanese respect for the U.S. presence in the Philippines.” Some go further by arguing that nearly half a century later, the Taft-Katsura Memorandum served as a precedent for the partition of Korea. [1] The United States had acquired the Philippines after its victory over Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898. In 1924, Tyler Dennett was the first scholar to obtain the document; He described it as “the text of the `executive agreement` perhaps the most remarkable in the history of U.S.

foreign relations. [2] The consensus of historians is that Dennett exaggerated the importance of a routine discussion that did not change anything and did not set new guidelines. Historians have pointed out that there is no formal agreement on anything new. [1] The word “agreement” in the documents simply means that both parties agreed that both the English and Japanese versions of the meeting notes covered the exact content of the conversations. [3] President Theodore Roosevelt then agreed that the Minister of War, Mr. Taft, had set out the American position. [2] In this agreement, the United States recognized Japan`s dominance in South Korea (the Korean Empire). In exchange, Japan recognized U.S.

dominance in the Philippines. This agreement was not published until Tyler DENNETT, a historian of American diplomacy, discovered it while searching for Theodore Roosevelt`s papers and published the contents of the telegram on this agreement that Taft sent from Taft in 1924 in a journal “Current History” to Elihu ROOT, then Secretary of State. It was not a signed document or a secret treaty, but only a memorandum that indicated their agreement to facilitate future relations between Japan and the United States.